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Abstract
We measured the continuous bodily  motion of participants as 
they lied to experimenters. These lies were spontaneous rather 
than elicited, and occurred for different motivations. In one 
situation, participants  were given the opportunity to  lie about 
their performance on a maths test in order to win money. In 
another, they witnessed one experimenter accidentally  break a 
laptop. When asked what had happened, participants were 
motivated to lie and deny any knowledge. Across these 
situations, participants lied 61% of the time, allowing us to 
contrast the body movements of liars with truth tellers as they 
answered neutral and critical questions. Those who lied had 
significantly reduced bodily  motion. In one case this  motion 
appeared before the experimenter had even asked the critical 
question. We conclude that a person’s bodily  dynamics  can be 
indicative of their cognitive and effective states, even when 
they would rather conceal them. 
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Introduction
While running in between parallel sessions at the next 
Cognitive Science conference, you catch the eye of a 
colleague from your university. They smile and ask what 
you thought of the talk they gave that morning, the one you 
promised to attend.  Since you know that the sessions were 
both crowded and dimly lit, you take a chance, smile, and 
say, ‘Of course I was there. It was fantastic,  as always.” Will 
they believe your deliberate falsehood? What in your choice 
of words, gestures and behaviour will make you sound 
either convincing or conniving?
The good news for you is that it is very unlikely your 
colleague will be able to tell that you are lying. Regardless 
of their training or self belief, people are able to detect 
deception in others at only a fraction above chance levels 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008; DePaulo,  Stone, & Lassiter, 
1985; K!hnken, 1987; Vrij 1993,  2000). The bad news for 
your colleague, professionals who need to know if people 
are lying, and those studying deception is that many 
researchers have found no unique and reliable behavioural 
signature for deception (Vrij,  2008; Ekman, 1992; Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al., 1985, 2003). 
One reason is that deception is a daily activity and a 
diverse phenomenon (DePaulo et al.,  1996). Sometimes a lie 
means making up a story, sometimes it means a simple 
denial. Lying can be done out of kindness or out of self 
interest. It can have different consequences and place 
different emotional and cognitive demands on the liar (Vrij 
& Mann, 2004).
It may not be surprising, then, that a clear link between 
deceit and bodily activity has proven elusive (DePaulo et al., 
2003). Whilst some researchers have demonstrated 
increased movements of the fingers, arms, hands, legs and 
feet whilst deceiving (McClintock & Hunt, 1975), even if 
only anecdotally (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009), others report 
decreased limb movements (Vrij, 2008).
Set against this long tradition of deception research are 
more recent findings in cognitive science regarding the 
relationship between motor control and cognitive 
processing. Thinking about the past versus the future shifts 
the direction that your body tilts (Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 
2010) moving marbles upwards rather than downwards 
changes the emotional content of the memories you recall 
(Casasanto & Dijkstra, in press), swaying in time with 
another person and mimicking their actions they make 
causes you to like each other (Chartrand & Van Baaren 
2009), and how you move your mouse cursor when asked 
‘Do you like Black people?’ reveals the influence of 
negative stereotypes (Wojnowicz et al., 2009). Many of 
these recent findings rely on fine grained, continuous 
measures or manipulations of motor activity,  rather than 
discrete, categorical behaviours such as button presses (see 
Spivey, 2007 for a motivation). Is it possible to use these 
continuous methods to detect a behavioural signal to 
deception?
Recently, Duran, Dale & McNamara (in press) adapted a 
standard paradigm in deception research, and asked people 
to respond yes or no to certain questions about themselves. 
They were instructed to give false answers in some cases 
and truthful answers in others. In this experiment, they 
signalled their responses using a Wiimote-controller that 
translated their hand movements into movements of a 
cursor.  They found that deceitful answers had a 
characteristic movement trajectory, with increased 
complexity and competition from other responses. This 
exciting evidence suffers from only one flaw - it is rare that 
people ask us to lie to them. Regardless, Duran et al’s 
findings suggest that perhaps there is more in motor 
behaviour than has typically been measured by deception 
researchers. 
In deception research, bodily behaviour is usually 
videotaped and coded by experimenters.  However, this is a 
laborious,  costly and inaccurate method as reliability 
between coders must be established, extensive training can 
be necessary and only bodily movements discernible to the 
human eye can be analysed. Furthermore, because it is 
necessary to be selective in such a coding method, it 
requires an understanding of what bodily movements are 
potentially interesting to examine before it is possible to 
begin coding.  As we have noted, the consensus is that there 
is no reliable behavioural profile for deceit. An ideal, for 
both practical and theoretical goals, is an automated system 
which will record accurate bodily changes and provide an 
objective approach to the study of deception (Burgoon et al., 
2005; Vrij & Mann, 2004). Such a method, we believe, must 
be able to maintain the complexity of continuous variables.
Our goal in this experiment was to use continuous, 
objective measures of the bodily activity of participants 
who were engaged in spontaneous deceptive behaviour. 
Participants were told they were in a study about posture 
and mental arithmetic. This gave us an excuse to measure 
their body position at 24 locations 200 times a second. It 
also provided the opportunity for them to lie. We offered 
them £5 for improving their score in a second round of the 
maths test. Although the task became much harder, so that 
score was most likely to decrease, only the participants 
could know how well they had performed. Therefore, 
participants were given the opportunity to tell a lie for a 
monetary reward, without the risk of being caught out.
During the experiment, the participants witnessed the 
junior experimenter accidentally knock a laptop off of a 
table. The laptop belonged to a senior experimenter who 
was absent at the time. Later, when he was unable to turn on 
his laptop, he asked the participants if they had seen 
anything happen to it. The junior experimenter was very 
friendly and the senior experimenter quite unpleasant, and 
we assumed that this would provided a second motivation to 
deceive.  We hoped that the participants would be motivated 
to cover up for her,  and falsely deny knowledge of the 
incident. During these moments, when participants thought 
that the real experiment had finished, and when they could 
freely chose to tell the truth or lie, we captured their bodily 
motion. 
Methods
Participants
32 participants took part in two experiments, run in a single 
session. They were UCL students or members of UCL’s 
subject pool, and received course credit or a payment for 
their participation.  There were 20 females and 12 males, 
with a mean age of 22.5 years old.
Apparatus
The experiment took place in UCL’s Multimodal Lab. Six 
high speed infrared cameras were mounted on a rail around 
the perimeter of a 5m square area. Participants wore a tight, 
stretchable shirt and a cap which had 20 plastic markers 
arrayed over them (see Figure 1). The markers were 
approximately 2cm in diameter and are highly reflective in 
infrared light. Additional markers were attached to the 
hands, tips of the index fingers and the face. Image data 
from the cameras was passed to the Vicon Nexus motion 
tracking system at a rate of 200 Hz. The 3D position of each 
marker was reconstructed with an accuracy of 0.1mm. A 
digital camera recorded a view of the participants’ actions, 
and a ladybug 2, 360º panoramic camera recorded all events 
in the lab. A ceiling mounted omnidirectional mic provided 
a sound recording. Participants carried out the experiment 
sat 50cm or stood 200cm away from a Mac laptop.
Procedure
Participants were told the study was investigating the 
relationship between body sway and mathematical ability. 
After donning the motion capture clothes,  they stood in a T-
pose with arms outstretched for a brief calibration recording.
Figure 1. A participant wearing the motion tracking shirt and hat (right) and the 
3D position of the markers reconstructed by the motion tracking system (left)
The participants then took part in a simple maths test. After 
the experiment they were debriefed to the true aim of the 
study, and gave additional retrospective consent with the 
option to withdraw their data, which none chose to do.
Three experimenters ran the study. One operated the 
motion tracking systems and did not interact with the 
participant. The other two experimenters dealt with the 
participants according to a well rehearsed script. The senior, 
male experimenter acted in a cold and unpleasant manner 
throughout. The junior female experimenter, who was an 
undergraduate like the participants, was friendly and 
engaging.  The experimental procedure was designed to put 
participants in two situations in which they might chose to 
lie spontaneously to the experimenters. For clarity, we will 
describe those two situations separately, even though the 
events they describe partially overlapped with each other. In 
each, motion is captured in two periods: as the participants 
reply to a neutral question, and as they reply to a question 
that has a motivation for deception. Participants were 
unaware that each of these periods were the critical portions 
of the experiment and that their behaviour was being 
recorded.
The Maths Test Following calibration, participants were 
seated at a table and given a maths test on a laptop. There 
were 30 multiplication questions with three multiple 
choices. Participants had a limited time to respond and were 
given feedback on their answer. A pilot test showed that 
people scored around 75% on the test.
After completing the test,  participants were shown their 
score. The junior experimenter told them that they were now 
required to repeat the test, but this time standing up while 
the motion tracking system measured their balance. She 
explained that our hypothesis was that standing would 
improve maths performance. She said that was what we had 
found so far, and hoped to prove conclusively.  In violation 
of good experimental practice, she deliberately increased the 
demand characteristic of the ‘experiment’  by telling 
participants how they should perform. In addition, she 
explained that participants would receive a £5 reward if 
their results followed the hypothesised pattern and they 
scored better while standing.
The participants were told that since they were standing 
out of reach of the keyboard, they couldn’t enter their 
answer. They were instructed not to voice their answers 
aloud but keep count of how many they had calculated 
correctly.  The time given for participants to respond in the 
standing phase gradually reduced. Norming tests confirmed 
that this made the test considerably harder, but since they 
were not inputting their answers,  only the participants 
themselves could ever know their score on the standing 
phase.
Once they had completed the study, the junior 
experimenter asked two questions, with the order 
counterbalanced between participants. The neutral question 
was “Did you feel the second stage took more or less time to 
complete?” The critical question was “Did your 
performance improve on the second test?”. Participants’ 
body motion was captured from the time she began asking 
the question to the end of their reply.
Participants who answered ‘yes’ to the critical question 
received their £5 reward and were categorised as liars. Even 
though it is possible that the participants scored higher on 
the second test, the increased difficulty made this unlikely. 
Therefore overall, we assumed that people who said yes 
were more likely to be deceptive than those who said no.
The Accident At the start of the experiment,  while the 
participant was signing the consent form, the senior 
researcher precariously placed a laptop down on a table 
saying, “I’ve got that report of yours on my laptop. Remind 
me about it at the end”. After the first stage of the maths 
test, the senior experimenter left the lab and the junior 
experimenter prepared them for the standing phase. While 
walking backwards,  the junior experimenter knocked into 
the laptop that had been left on the table edge, and sent it 
crashing to the floor. She exclaimed loudly, made eye 
contact with the participant and said, “Thank God the 
cameras were off”. Therefore, only the participant witnessed 
this ‘accident’.
After the second maths test, the senior experimenter came 
back to the lab and told the participant that he needed to 
take a backup copy of the data. While the junior 
experimenter was stood in a corner of the lab preparing 
herself to leave, he asked the participant the neutral 
question, “Did the maths experiment run okay?” He then 
opened his laptop and attempted to turn it on without 
success. He then turned to the participant and asked the 
critical question, “Did you see anything happen?” During 
both questions and the participant’s replies,  their body 
motion was recorded. Participants were categorised as liars 
if they denied knowledge about the incident, and as truth 
tellers if they made any reference to the accident or the 
junior participant.
Debriefing Following the experiment, participants were 
fully debriefed about the true nature of the experiment and 
asked if they suspected that deception was being 
investigated. We framed all their behaviour in a positive 
light. For example, if they chose to deceive the senior 
experimenter about the accident, we referred to this as their 
choice to ‘protect’  the junior researcher. Contact details of 
psychological services were provided in the event that they 
felt concerned about deceiving or being deceived.
Data Analysis
Marker positions were reconstructed offline using the Vicon 
Nexus software. Standard procedures were used for 
identifying markers and excluding noise.  For each marker 
we calculated the distance it moved in 5msec. We summed 
those values for series of 20 frames to get the total number 
of millimeters travelled in each 100ms period. Finally, 
across every marker and across every 100ms period during 
the data capture,  we averaged those values. Our measure of 
general body motion is operationalized as the average 
distance in millimeters that a marker traveled every 100ms.
Results
Participants data was discarded if they guessed our real 
hypothesis, in cases of experimenter error or deviations 
from the script. The complexity of the equipment and the 
spontaneous nature of the behaviour meant that data loss 
was a risk in this experiment. In the event, 34 (out of 128) 
trials produced unusable data. Since a full analysis of the 
data would require that we have data for all four periods for 
all subjects, we carried out planned comparisons on the 
maths deception and the accident data separately, giving us 
18 and 23 subjects respectively. However, the same pattern 
of means and significance was still found when we analysed 
the smaller set of 16 subjects who had a full set of data for 
each cell.
This study is a quasi experiment, as participants placed 
themselves in the truth or lie conditions rather than being 
assigned. Overall, they chose to lie 61% of the time, 
allowing a between subjects comparison of the body motion 
of truth tellers and liars.  Body motion data were analysed in 
a 2 (deception: truth teller/liar) x 2 (question type: neutral/
critical) ANOVA.
The Maths Test
Participants moved less if they attempted to deceive the 
experimenter and lie about their maths score. They moved 
more when asked the critical question than when asked the 
neutral question, though the difference between truth tellers 
and liars was greater in response to the critical question. 
This pattern of results is shown in panel A of Figure 2, and 
supported by a main effect of deception (F(1,21)=7.97, p=.
01), a main effect of question (F(1,21)=9.04, p=.007) and a 
significant interaction (F(1,21)=6.24, p=.021). Post hocs 
show that the participants did not significantly differ in their 
motion in response to the neutral question,  but moved 
significantly more when telling the truth in response to the 
critical question.  
The Accident
Participants moved less if they attempted to deceive the 
experimenter and deny knowledge of the accident. They 
also moved less overall in response to the critical question. 
This pattern of results is shown in panel B of Figure 2, and 
supported by a main effect of deception (F(1,21)=7.97, p=.
01) and a main effect of question (F(1,21)=9.04, p=.007). 
The interaction was not significant (F(1,21)=1.11).
General Discussion
When people spontaneously lied to us,  they reduced their 
bodily motion. Behind this simple finding, robustly 
supported by our data, lie two more nuanced stories. One 
concerns the directionality of the relationship between body 
motion and deceptive behaviour. The other concerns the 
difference between the two situations and the two types of 
lie.
In the maths test,  there was no obvious negative 
consequence to the participants’  lie. The junior experimenter 
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Figure 1. Total upper body motion during neutral and critical questions in the maths test and accident situations
gave clear signs that she would prefer a particular answer, 
and participants were given a monetary reward for 
providing it. It was clear from the situation that there was no 
way in which participants could be found out if they lied, 
since they could be the only people who knew the truth. 
Therefore, participants had everything to gain and nothing 
to lose by lying. In this situation, participants’  body motion 
was not different in response to the neutral question, but 
those who chose to lie for the reward showed less motion 
when answering the critical question. 
This result aligns with other findings (Vrij, 2000) that 
during cases of deception, bodily motion can decrease. One 
explanation is that even though there is no logical way that 
another person can know that we are telling a lie, we suffer 
from an ‘illusion of transparency’ (Gilovich, Medvec & 
Savitsky, 1998). We are prone to thinking that since our own 
internal mental states are highly salient to us, they must be 
at least partially visible to others. Therefore,  when we think 
about something that we don’t want others to know, we try 
to suppress our overt actions in an attempt to suppress the 
(nonexistent) cues to our mental states. As often happens, it 
is not the lie that causes people to be caught, but the cover-
up.
In the accident situation, the motivation and the 
consequences for lying are quite different. By lying, 
participants are acting in the interest of another person, the 
junior experimenter. Our intention was that the participants 
would feel some affiliation with her, due to her overt 
friendliness to the participants and their similarity in age and 
position. In sharp contrast, the senior experimenter asserted 
his authority over everyone else in the lab, and was curt and 
unpleasant when speaking to the participant. By lying to 
him, the participants are aligning their interests with their 
in-group, which is a strong motivation for social behaviour. 
However, unlike the maths test situation, there could 
conceivably be negative consequences to this lie.  Something 
did indeed happen to the laptop,  and it’s possible that the 
senior experimenter could find out what happened in the 
future - perhaps the junior experimenter would confess. In 
this case, the participants would be discovered to have lied 
to someone in authority.
Both the motivation (DePaulo et al., 2003) and the 
possible consequences of the social lie are related to 
affective outcomes. In contrast to the maths lie, where only 
money is at stake, in the accident situation, participants lie 
to foster an affiliation between themselves and the junior 
experimenter, but risk the aversive consequences of lying to 
an authority figure. We hypothesise that these differences 
produced an unusual feature of our data. 
For the accident situation, the difference between liars and 
truth tellers emerged in responses to both the neutral and the 
critical questions. The neutral question was always asked 
before the critical question in the accident situation, as pilot 
studies showed that it seemed very unnatural for the 
experimenter to interrogate the participant about his broken 
laptop, and then switch to innocuous questions.
So why is it that participants who are going to lie to the 
experimenter in the near future already show a distinctive 
pattern of body motion when answering his neutral 
question? In looking back over the situation we constructed 
for participants, it seems that they may have already been 
thinking about the laptop and the incident they witnessed 
during the neutral question. While asking the neutral 
question, “Did the maths experiment run okay?” the senior 
experimenter was walking towards the table where the 
broken laptop was sat. This, coupled with the fact that he 
mentioned he was taking a backup of the data, makes it 
plausible to suggest that the participants realised he was 
about to use his laptop. At that point, perhaps they were 
considering the affective consequences of him discovering 
the accident, accusing the junior researcher, and asking them 
for information. In other words, even during the neutral 
question, participants’ body motion was revealing their 
relation to the whole scenario of the accident and the two 
different researchers, and their own potential involvement. 
This claim brings us to the second issue raised by these 
findings. Is it the case that there are some individuals, or 
some individuals’ moods, that correlate with higher levels of 
bodily motion and higher levels of honesty? Or does the act 
of forming a lie or preparing to tell the truth produce a 
particular pattern of bodily motion?  In the context of the 
accident situation,  for example, it could be that during the 
neutral question some individuals are feeling heightened 
anxiety (because of what they witnessed),  and that anxiety 
produces more bodily motion and higher rates of telling the 
truth. Alternatively, it could be that during the neutral 
question, some participants are already acting to suppress 
their overt behaviour as they prepare to tell a lie to the 
experimenter, or at least, distance themselves from the 
awkward situation.
In short, does body motion reveal differences between 
people who tell the truth and people who lie, or does it 
reveal differences in the process of lying and truth telling? 
There is some evidence for the latter proposal in our maths 
test situation. If it were true that some people simply move 
more and are more disposed to honesty, then we would 
expect to see truth tellers moving more in response to the 
neutral maths question as well as the critical question. 
Furthermore, supporting evidence for a direct link between 
motion and deception comes from experiments which 
instruct participants to lie or tell the truth, and thereby cause 
differences in bodily movements (Duran et al.,  in press). At 
present though, our data are equivocal on this point,  and 
calls for further investigation. 
Conclusion
People who spontaneously lie, or are about to lie, showed 
reduced body motion in our experiment. Though this pattern 
was found across two different types of situation, we are not 
rushing to make any claims to have found a unique bodily 
signature for deceptive behaviour. Differences in the two 
types of situation produced distinct patterns in degree of 
bodily motion and the conditions under which it emerged. 
We have speculated that these bodily differences are related 
to differences in the underlying motivations and 
consequences of deception in the two situations. We take 
this work as establishing that motion capture systems are a 
new telescope that we can point at deception, and 
reaffirming the complexity of cognitive and affective states 
that underlie spontaneous deceptive behaviour. 
It remains the case that almost no-one is much better than 
a coin toss at detecting deception in others (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006). A notable exception are the FBI 
interrogators trained and tested by Ekman and O’Sullivan 
(1991). In their article, ‘Who can catch a liar?’  they reported 
a deception detection rate of 64%. Recently Bond (2008) 
came across a passage in Ekman’s (1992) book giving 
further details of that experiment. As it is described, the 
study has a striking similarity to our own maths test 
situation that was designed to evoke spontaneous lies:
“Immediately after taking the test I would give the 
correct answers. Then I asked them to raise their 
hands if they got all ten correct, nine correct, and so 
forth. I tallied the results on a blackboard so that 
they could evaluate their own performance against 
that of their group. . . . In September 1991, our 
findings on these professional lie catchers were 
published”
(Ekman, 1992; pp. 282–285)
As Bond (2008) concluded, “Who can catch a liar?  It 
would appear to be Secret Service agents who get to score 
their own tests.” It is an intriguing thought that these FBI 
agents,  might themselves have displayed signature patterns 
of bodily movement that betrayed the fact that they were 
actually lying about their ability to detect liars. 
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